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Abstract 
 
Prior literature is mixed as to whether smoothing through accruals indicates higher or lower 
financial reporting quality (Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008; Dechow et al. 2010). 
Motivated by the unique inter-temporal features and reporting incentives of tax expense, we 
provide new evidence on this debate by examining the link between smoothing of GAAP 
effective tax rates (ETRs) and the likelihood of financial restatements. Different from earnings 
smoothing’s insignificant relation with restatements, we find that ETR smoothing through tax 
accruals is associated with a lower likelihood of financial restatement and lower likelihood of 
tax-related financial reporting fraud. Further investigation reveals that such negative associations 
are stronger in firms with a higher level of discretion in tax reporting and when the demand and 
monitoring for transparent reporting is higher. We also document corroborating evidence that 
smoothing through tax accruals increases the informativeness of GAAP ETRs for predicting 
future cash ETRs. Collectively, our results contribute to the financial reporting and tax literatures 
by providing evidence that smoothing activities pertaining to tax accruals are consistent with 
higher financial reporting quality.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
An open question in financial accounting is whether smoothing activities are associated 
with higher or lower financial reporting quality (Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008; 
Dechow et al. 2010). One feature of accrual accounting is that accruals help remove extreme 
performance volatility. As a result, earnings based on accruals can better predict firms’ long-term 
profits (Dechow 1994). This feature suggests that earnings smoothing is associated with higher 
financial reporting quality. However, common ways to manipulate earnings, such as creating 
reserves in profitable years or overstating earnings during negative shocks, can also manifest as 
earnings smoothing, obscuring value-relevant variation in firm performance. Consistent with the 
latter argument, earnings smoothing has been found to be negatively associated with alternative 
measures of financial reporting quality (Dechow et al. 2010). Therefore, it is unclear if 
smoothing through accruals is related to higher or lower financial reporting quality. To provide 
new evidence on whether smoothing activities indicate higher or lower financial reporting 
quality, we examine this question through a new perspective: the smoothing of GAAP effective 
tax rates (ETRs) through tax accruals and its link to financial reporting quality as measured by 
restatements and the ability of GAAP ETRs to predict future cash ETRs.    
The smoothing of GAAP ETRs through tax accruals provides a unique setting to study 
the link between smoothing activities and reporting quality. First, tax expense is one of the 
largest corporate costs, making it an important determinant of earnings, and its reporting 
involves significant managerial discretion. Second, different from other cost items, tax is a non-
core expense, and reporting abnormally low tax rates may invite scrutiny from tax authorities 
and increase the risk of audits and additional payments (Bozanic et al. 2017). Therefore, instead 
of pursuing an ever-decreasing tax rate, investors put a greater focus on the stability of GAAP 
ETRs. A survey by the Tax Executives Institute found that about 70 percent of tax executives are 
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evaluated on their ability to avoid tax-related surprises (TEI 2005). Despite this emphasis on the 
stability of GAAP ETRs by investors and managers, whether the smoothing of GAAP ETRs 
through tax accruals is linked to higher or lower reporting quality remains unknown.  
  Second, tax expense has a distinct inter-temporal relationship with firms’ fundamental 
earnings. Most other costs have a fixed portion, so that when fundamental earnings deteriorate, 
cost percentages increase. The smoothing of cost percentages, therefore, creates reserves during 
good days and covers up earnings shortages during difficult times. Tax rates, however, stay 
mostly unchanged since they are proportionate to earnings, and even decrease when earnings 
deteriorate dramatically due to the progressive nature of the corporate tax system. As a result, 
using tax accruals to cover shortages in core earnings (i.e., by artificially depressing GAAP 
ETRs) generally increases the volatility of GAAP ETRs. For this reason, if firms are committed 
to smoothing GAAP ETRs, they are restrained from misreporting tax accruals for covering up 
shortages in core earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Krull 2004; Frank and Rego 2006; Cazier et al. 
2015). Anticipating such a restraining effect, firms that exhibit higher ETR smoothing may be 
more likely to be the ones who commit to a more transparent earnings reporting strategy overall.       
To empirically test the relation between ETR smoothing and financial reporting quality, 
we develop a new measure of GAAP ETR smoothing, based on the intuition in Jayaraman 
(2008), as the inverse difference in volatilities of GAAP ETRs and cash ETRs.1 Our measure 
exploits the direct disclosure of both accrual-based tax expense and its corresponding cash taxes 
                                                          
1 GAAP (cash) ETR is calculated as total tax expense (cash taxes paid) scaled by pretax income. Our GAAP ETR 
smoothing measure is calculated as -1×(Variance of GAAP ETR – Variance of Cash ETR). We multiply by -1 to 
facilitate interpretability so that higher levels represent greater GAAP ETR smoothing through tax accruals. Also see 
Section III. We focus on GAAP tax rates, rather than tax payment levels, because Graham et al. (2014) find that 
managers of public firms consider GAAP tax rates to be a significantly more important metric than cash taxes paid, 
and Armstrong et al. (2012) find that GAAP ETRs are the only tax metric associated with tax director compensation. 
Thus, the role of smoothing of tax accruals should be more evident around effective tax rates rather than levels of 
estimated taxable income or cash taxes paid. 
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paid to isolate the smoothing effect of managers’ estimation of tax accruals from the volatility in 
firms’ fundamental tax payouts determined by innate firm performance and tax planning. In 
measuring financial reporting quality, we primarily focus on overall earnings misreporting 
evident in restatements. In particular, we examine both tax-related and non-tax-related financial 
restatements to gauge the extent to which GAAP ETR smoothing is an indicator for overall 
financial reporting quality.  
We use restatements to proxy for financial reporting quality as they are direct measures 
of poor financial reporting quality, and are not subject to the considerable measurement error in 
discretionary accrual models (Li and Zhu 2016). Restatements also do not rely on market-based 
information (Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008), which matters in a smoothing context 
because investors may not understand or price smoothing (McInnis 2010). Nevertheless, to 
triangulate our evidence on restatements, which may still suffer from detection bias, we also use 
a second financial reporting quality measure, based on tax information by examining whether the 
ability of GAAP ETRs for predicting future cash ETRs is stronger when GAAP ETR smoothing 
is higher. If the smoothing of GAAP ETRs is indicative of higher financial reporting quality, it 
should (1) be negatively associated with the likelihood of financial restatements; and (2) 
strengthen the informativeness of GAAP ETR for predicting future cash ETR outcomes.2  
Our empirical analyses provide new evidence on the link between smoothing activities, 
as they pertain to tax accruals, and financial reporting quality. First, we find that GAAP ETR 
smoothing is negatively associated with the likelihood of restatements, especially for fraudulent 
reporting cases and tax-related restatements. We estimate that, on average, a one standard 
                                                          
2 We use the term informativeness to refer to the ability of GAAP ETRs to predict future cash ETRs. This definition 
is consistent with recent literature that examines the mapping of financial accruals to future cash outcomes (e.g., 
Badertscher et al. 2012). This definition does not consider assumptions about market efficiency or rely on the 
market’s perception of the informativeness of smoothing, which is important as investors may not understand and/or 
price the information content in smoothing (McInnis 2010) or taxes (Lev and Nissim 2004; Weber 2009). 
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deviation increase in GAAP ETR smoothing decreases the likelihood of tax-related (non-tax-
related) restatements by 0.5 (0.8) percent overall, or 12.8 (6.8) percent conditional on the base 
likelihood. GAAP ETR smoothing also decreases the likelihood of tax-related fraud events by 
0.001 percent, or 47 percent conditional on the base likelihood. Interestingly, we find that the 
smoothing of pretax income is not related to the likelihood of restatement, which mirrors the 
literature’s mixed inferences on the link between earnings smoothing and reporting quality. Such 
a direct contrast between our results on GAAP ETR smoothing and pretax earnings smoothing 
highlights the uniqueness of GAAP ETR smoothing as it relates to identifying overall financial 
reporting quality.  
We also find that GAAP ETR smoothing is associated with greater informativeness of 
GAAP ETRs regarding future cash ETRs. We estimate that, on average, a one standard deviation 
increase in GAAP ETR smoothing increases the ability of GAAP ETRs to predict future cash 
ETRs by an economically significant 31 percent. In combination with our previous findings, 
these results suggest that GAAP ETR smoothing through tax accruals credibly communicates 
long-term tax outcomes, and such a smoothing strategy is incompatible with using tax accruals in 
manipulating earnings opportunistically. In short, our results suggest that smoothing of GAAP 
ETRs through tax accruals indicates higher overall financial reporting quality. 
In additional tests, we show that GAAP ETR smoothing is negatively associated with the 
occurrence of accounting restatements only when the adjustment to shareholders’ equity is 
negative. That is, smoothing of ETRs and restatements are strongly negatively linked in cases 
when accruals inflated earnings. This finding is consistent with the idea that smoothing is 
incompatible with egregious, income-increasing manipulation, and thus it is a credible indicator 
of higher overall earnings reporting quality.  
We further document that the informativeness of GAAP ETR smoothing on overall 
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reporting quality is mostly driven by the discretionary portion of tax accrual reporting. We find 
that when we decompose GAAP ETR smoothing into discretionary and non-discretionary 
components using (1) a model from Mayberry et al. (2015); (2) firms’ deviations from industry-
year averages; or (3) firms’ deviations from their own historical averages, it is the discretionary 
smoothing component that drives the negative association between ETR smoothing and 
likelihood of restatement. Relatedly, we find that when firms have foreign operations or higher 
research and development (R&D) and intangibles, both of which are subject to higher tax 
reporting discretion, GAAP ETR smoothing indicates even higher overall reporting quality. 
Finally, we find that the negative association between ETR smoothing and likelihood of 
restatement is more prominent with greater monitoring, i.e., when firms have greater institutional 
ownership and analyst following. These results suggest that managers committed to greater ETR 
smoothing also seem to commit to higher overall financial reporting quality, especially when 
monitoring and demand for greater reporting quality is high. 
Our study makes several contributions to the accounting literature. First, our findings 
provide new evidence on the relation between smoothing activities and overall financial 
reporting quality. Although earnings smoothing is a highly favored reporting strategy by 
managers (Graham et al. 2005), the extent to which smoothing leads to more informative 
reporting is “very much an open question” (Dechow et al. 2010, 362). Few studies examine the 
informativeness of earnings smoothing, and those that do find mixed evidence (e.g., Tucker and 
Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008; McInnis 2010; Dechow et al. 2010). This study highlights and 
takes advantage of the important differences between earnings smoothing through total accruals 
and ETR smoothing through tax accruals. Unlike earnings smoothing that could be the result of 
either earnings manipulation or signaling long-term earnings, and therefore is unrelated to 
occurrence of misreporting, ETR smoothing appears to restrain firms from using tax accruals for 
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earnings manipulation purposes.   
Second, while prior literature exhibits the importance of GAAP ETRs to managers 
(Phillips 2003; Armstrong et al. 2012; Graham et al. 2014) and provides evidence of the lack of 
variation in GAAP ETR changes over time (Kubata et al. 2016), the implications of GAAP ETR 
smoothing remain unexplored. We construct a new measure of GAAP ETR smoothing that 
captures smoothing through the reporting of tax accruals rather than tax avoidance or tax 
planning (Mayberry et al. 2015), and find that such smoothing is associated with higher financial 
reporting quality. These findings extend our basic understanding of GAAP ETR smoothing.  
Third, we add to the literature on the informational role of tax accruals, which have been 
mostly studied in the context of aiding earnings management for opportunistic reasons. As such, 
concern over the use of tax accruals in earnings management is shared by both information users 
and their providers. Per Dichev et al. (2013), CFOs deem earnings to be of higher quality when 
they are not tied to changes in ETRs, while Gleason and Mills (2008) find that investors respond 
more strongly to earnings news when tax expense is not used to meet firms’ earnings targets. In 
this study, we document an inter-temporal reporting strategy of tax accruals that represent 
managers’ response to such concerns. Our evidence shows that managers using tax accruals to 
smooth out volatilities in GAAP ETRs seem to also be committed to not using tax accruals in 
earnings manipulation. Rather, GAAP ETR smoothing credibly conveys information about long-
term cash tax ETR outcomes. Thus, our findings establish new links between tax accrual 
reporting strategies and reporting qualities for both overall earnings and cash tax outcomes.  
This paper develops as follows. Section II describes the related literature and develops 
our hypothesis. Section III describes our methodology. We report our results in Section IV and 
conclude in Section V.  
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II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Earnings Smoothing and Earnings Quality 
Despite earnings smoothing being a highly favored and commonly practiced inter-
temporal reporting strategy (Graham et al. 2005), both researchers and industry professionals 
have conflicting views on whether earnings smoothing is a representation of higher or lower 
earnings quality. Some academic sources point to smoothness as a desirable quality of earnings 
because it indicates the natural stability of operations or the elimination of transitory noise by the 
accrual process or benevolent managers (e.g. Dechow 1994; Subramanyam 1996; Dichev and 
Tang 2008). In particular, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that the stock returns of firms with 
greater earnings smoothing contain more information about future earnings.3 Other studies point 
to the opposite interpretation, emphasizing the opportunistic and misleading “over-smoothing” of 
earnings with respect to the underlying cash flows or economic events (Leuz et al. 2003). 
Consistent with the latter view, Jayaraman (2008) finds that bid-ask spreads and the likelihood of 
insider trading are higher for firms that engage in more earnings smoothing, while Li and Zhu 
(2016) collect detailed restatement information and show that managers overstate (understate) 
accruals when actual earnings and cash flow performance is low (high).  
When examining the correlation between earnings smoothing and other indicators of 
earnings quality, Dechow et al. (2010) find that smoothing through accruals is negatively 
correlated with alternative indicators of earnings quality, including the level and volatility of 
accruals and accrual estimation errors. Survey evidence based on CFOs’ views on earnings 
quality echoes the conflicting view held by researchers (Dichev et al. 2013); although admitting 
                                                          
3 The research design used by Tucker and Zarowin (2006, 252) explicitly assumes “the informational efficiency of 
stock price.” Our results for earnings and ETR smoothing differ in that our research design does not rely on 
assumptions about the efficiency of stock prices with respect to smoothing, since investors do not appear to 
incorporate information about smoothing into stock price (McInnis 2010). 
8 
 
pressure to report smooth earnings, CFOs do not rate earnings smoothing through accruals as an 
indicator of high earnings quality. Instead, they list earnings that are too smooth relative to 
economic fundamentals, especially in volatile industries, as a red flag for earnings manipulation.  
GAAP ETR Smoothing through Tax Accruals  
In discussing reporting quality, Dechow et al. (2010, 362) emphasize differentiating 
inherent or fundamental smoothness from smoothness related to accounting choice. In this study 
where we use a tax setting to inform financial reporting quality, we make such a distinction 
between fundamental smoothness and smoothing related to accounting choice. In particular, we 
isolate smoothing related to accounting choice as the difference (inverse difference) between the 
smoothness (volatility) of GAAP ETRs and the smoothness (volatility) of cash ETRs. Here, the 
smoothness of cash ETRs captures the impact of the firm’s fundamental performance and tax 
planning on the stability of cash tax payouts per unit of income. Thus, the difference between the 
smoothness of GAAP ETRs and cash ETRs isolates the extent to which tax accruals, which are a 
function of accounting choice, smooth out (or intensify) the variance in underlying cash ETRs. 
We refer to this difference as the smoothing of GAAP ETRs through tax accruals. 
Within the tax setting, recent research examines the smoothness of cash taxes paid and its 
implications for the level of future tax outcomes, persistence of pre-tax earnings, or disclosure 
transparency. These studies use the ratio of the standard deviation of estimated taxable income to 
the standard deviation of pretax cash flows as the (inverse) measure of smoothness.4 In 
particular, Mayberry et al. (2015) find that smoothness in the level of estimated taxable income 
is associated with lower levels of future cash ETRs, suggesting that better managerial control 
over the tax function enables greater tax avoidance through tax planning over future periods. In 
                                                          
4 We stress that this measure of smoothness is of the amount of taxable income as inferred from current tax expense 
only, not the cash ETR, which includes the effects of temporary differences. In contrast, we focus on effective tax 
rates because they are more likely than taxable income or tax expense to be a reporting target (Graham et al. 2014). 
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extending the idea that smoothness indicates better managerial control, McGuire et al. (2013) 
find that smoother cash ETRs contains information about the persistence of pre-tax earnings and 
earnings components, while Neuman et al. (2012) find that higher disclosure transparency is 
associated with smoother taxable income. These studies note that their measure of smoothness 
could reflect the volatility of underlying firm performance and/or managerial tax planning. In 
contrast, our design and definition of smoothing as the difference between the variances of 
GAAP and cash ETRs helps identify tax accrual reporting decisions distinct from firm 
performance or real cash impacts from tax planning because these latter effects are eliminated by 
subtracting out the volatility of cash ETRs. As a result, our measure can help inform whether 
smoothing due to accounting choice is related to financial reporting quality. 
Our research question is also related to, but distinct from prior literature studying the 
reporting of tax accruals. First, most of the literature focuses on the level of tax accruals and how 
they are manipulated to achieve certain earnings targets or their relation to earnings 
characteristics (see Graham et al. 2012). In contrast, we examine an inter-temporal reporting 
strategy of tax accruals by looking at their role in smoothing GAAP ETRs. Second, several 
recent studies examining the informativeness of tax accruals focus on their predictive ability with 
respect to cash tax payouts. Laux (2013) provides evidence on how certain deferred tax assets 
and liabilities map into future tax payments, while Ciconte et al. (2016) find that the FIN 48 tax 
reserve is positively associated with future income tax payments. Both results are consistent with 
tax accruals containing predictive information about future cash tax outcomes, but neither study 
sheds light on how smoothing activities affect the informativeness of tax reporting. Choudhary et 
al. (2016) extend the framework of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model to 
develop a measure for tax accrual quality that estimates the precision of how one-period past, 
current, and one-period future tax cash flows map into current tax expense. In contrast to these 
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studies, we look at the smoothing of GAAP ETRs as an inter-temporal reporting strategy, instead 
of a single period’s tax accrual quality. We also examine the implications of GAAP ETR 
smoothing not only for tax-specific reporting quality, but for overall financial reporting quality. 
GAAP ETR Smoothing and Reporting Quality  
The smoothing of GAAP ETRs through tax accruals provides a unique setting to study 
smoothing activities and reporting quality because the inter-temporal properties and the reporting 
incentives of tax rates are different from other cost or expense percentages. First, tax expense has 
a distinct inter-temporal relationship with firms’ fundamental earnings. Most other expenses 
have a fixed portion, thus when fundamental earnings deteriorate, cost percentages increase. The 
smoothing of cost percentages, therefore, helps to create reserves during good days and cover up 
earnings shortages during difficult times. Tax rates, however, stay mostly unchanged with the 
movement of fundamental earnings since they are proportionate to earnings, and even decrease 
when earnings deteriorate dramatically due to the progressive nature of the corporate tax system. 
As a result, using tax accruals to cover shortages in core earnings (i.e., by artificially depressing 
GAAP ETRs) generally increases the volatility of GAAP ETRs. For this reason, if firms are 
committed to smoothing GAAP ETRs, they are restrained from misreporting tax accruals for 
covering up shortages in core earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Krull 2004; Frank and Rego 2006; 
Cazier et al. 2015). Anticipating such a restraining effect, firms that exhibit higher ETR 
smoothing are more likely to be the ones who commit to a more transparent earnings reporting 
strategy overall. Therefore, such unique inter-temporal properties of tax rates suggest that ETR 
smoothing could be associated with higher reporting quality.       
 Also different from the lowering of other costs, such as cost of goods sold, which 
increase profitability and is welcomed by investors, abnormally low tax rates may invite scrutiny 
from tax authorities and increase the risk of tax audits and additional payments (Bozanic et al. 
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2017).  Thus, instead of pursuing ever-decreasing tax rates, there is greater emphasis on the 
stability of tax rates. The demand for reducing uncertainty in tax reporting also comes from the 
fact that tax expense does not represent a firm’s core profitability, yet the significant discretion in 
tax reporting potentially clouds earnings quality. Prior research documents that total tax accruals 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2004), as well as specific tax accruals (Krull 2004; Frank and Rego 2006; Cazier 
et al. 2015), are commonly used as mechanisms for overall earnings management (Graham et al. 
2012). Recent evidence suggests that sustainable tax reporting is a primary goal for many tax 
departments. For example, a survey conducted by the Tax Executives Institute found that about 
70 percent of tax executives were evaluated based on their ability to avoid tax-related surprises 
(TEI 2005). In addition, KPMG LLP (2007) argues that sustainable tax management is a critical 
long-term goal for companies because financial analysts view an unexpected change in a 
company’s tax rate as a signal of poor management. Consistent with this view, Dichev et al. 
(2013) document that CFOs deem earnings to be of higher quality when they are not tied to 
changes in ETRs. Furthermore, Gleason and Mills (2008) find that investors respond more 
strongly to earnings news when tax expense is not used to meet firms’ earnings targets. 
 The high demand for less uncertainty regarding GAAP ETRs could make smoothing of 
GAAP ETRs associated with either higher or lower reporting quality.  In response to the demand 
for less uncertainty, managers are likely to use tax accruals to smooth out volatilities in GAAP 
ETRs to communicate a long-term sustainable tax rate. In doing so, they are restrained from   
using accruals for earnings manipulation due to the reasons stated previously. Such a GAAP 
ETR smoothing strategy is a credible indicator for overall reporting quality, including both 
higher earnings quality and higher tax reporting quality. However, it is also likely that in the 
pursuit of stable GAAP ETRs, tax accruals are used to aggressively maintain the level of 
historical ETRs, disregarding the future long-term cash ETR rates. Such aggressive smoothing 
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through tax accruals could potentially result in restatements on tax reporting and decrease the 
current informativeness of GAAP ETRs for future cash ETRs. 
 Additionally, even absent demand for less uncertainty regarding GAAP ETRs, there are 
other incentives for managers to engage in GAAP ETR smoothing. For one, prior research shows 
that GAAP ETRs have significant impacts on managers’ compensation and career outcomes 
Phillips 2003; Armstrong et al. 2012; Chyz and Gaertner 2017). Thus managers have incentives 
to smooth ETRs to maintain smoother compensation (and thus smoother personal consumption), 
regardless of the impact of such smoothing on financial reporting quality. In addition, managers 
may be concerned about fluctuations in GAAP ETRs being used by tax authorities to select the 
firm for a tax audit (Graham et al. 2012; Bozanic et al. 2017). Thus, to avoid the costly audit 
process and potentially large tax assessments and penalties (Wilson 2009), managers may engage 
in aggressively smooth accrual management to hide informative GAAP ETR fluctuations from 
tax authorities, potentially sacrificing the informativeness of GAAP ETRs.    
   Based upon these opposing arguments, we state our central hypothesis in the null form:  
Hypothesis: GAAP ETR smoothing is not associated with higher financial reporting 
quality.  
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
GAAP ETR Smoothing Measure 
 To examine GAAP ETR smoothing, we build on the framework derived by Jayaraman 
(2008) to create a measure of GAAP ETR smoothing (GETR_SMO). The GAAP ETR can be 
deconstructed as follows: 
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑇𝑅 =
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
=
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
+
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
= 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑇𝑅 
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Thus, the variance of the GAAP ETR can be expressed as: 
             𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑇𝑅)
= 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑇𝑅)
+ 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅, 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑇𝑅) 
 As shown above, the variance of GAAP ETRs is generated by three sources: the variance 
of cash ETRs, the variance of tax accrual ETRs, and their covariance. To create our ETR 
smoothing measure, we calculate the variance of the GAAP ETR and the cash ETR over the 
current year and the prior two years (i.e., over t, t-1, and t-2).5 We then subtract the variance of 
the cash ETR from the variance of the GAAP ETR so that only variation that is related to tax 
accruals is left, and multiply this measure by negative one so that higher levels represent 
smoother GAAP ETRs relative to cash ETRs. This approach gives us our measure of GAAP 
ETR smoothing (i.e., GETR_SMO) due to tax accrual choices as follows: 
GETR_SMO = -1 × [Var(GAAP ETRt-2,t-1,t) – Var(Cash ETRt-2,t-1,t)] 
Within this formulation, the GAAP ETR could be smoothed by reducing the variance of tax 
accruals and/or by changing the extent to which tax accruals covary with cash taxes paid. As 
described by Jayaraman (2008), both the variance of accruals and the extent to which accruals 
covary with cash flows are needed to measure smoothing. Alternate smoothing measures that 
focus only on the covariance between accruals and pre-managed earnings (e.g., Tucker and 
Zarowin 2006) can lead to problematic inferences, as they incorrectly classify certain accrual 
manipulations (e.g., big baths) as smoothing and do not effectively remove cash flow smoothness 
                                                          
5 We winsorize all ETRs to lie between zero and one before computing ETR variances (Dyreng et al. 2008). In 
untabulated tests, we find all of our results are robust to calculating our smoothing measure (and other smoothing 
and variance control variables mentioned below) over five and seven years. We display our results using three-year 
measures to maximize our number of observations and demonstrate the importance of even short-term smoothing. 
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from the “smoothing” measure (Jayaraman 2008; Mayberry et al. 2015).6  
Financial Reporting Quality Measure 
We use the occurrence of a financial statement restatement (Restatement) as our primary 
measure of reporting quality, with Restatement capturing lower quality in complying with GAAP 
reporting standards.7 Restatements are an ex-post measure of reporting quality, and thus are not 
subject to severe measurement errors. Discretionary accruals, on the other hand, have been 
shown to be highly correlated with firm fundamental characteristics (Dechow et al. 2010). Using 
restatements also has an advantage in identifying the role of managerial reporting discretion. 
Theoretically, GAAP ETR informativeness could be the product of GAAP standards and/or 
discretionary reporting choices of managers, while the occurrence of a restatement indicates a 
clear violation of GAAP. This means that an association between GAAP ETR smoothing and 
restatement occurrence is by definition not created by GAAP standards, but rather by the impact 
of discretionary managerial reporting on ETR smoothing.  
We use the occurrence of all types of restatements as our proxy for overall financial 
reporting quality. However, restatements could be due to managers’ intentional discretionary 
reporting or innocent errors in the application of GAAP. Therefore, we separately examine 
restatements that are determined to be fraudulent or have negative impacts on shareholder equity 
to focus on settings where a restatement is likely due to managers’ reporting discretion to inflate 
earnings. We also separately examine restatements involving tax reporting because GAAP ETR 
smoothing restrains managers from manipulating earnings directly through tax accruals, since the 
                                                          
6 In a supplemental test we split our measure into the portion due to (a) the variance of accruals and (b) the 
covariance of accruals and cash flows, and examine the effects of each portion separately on financial reporting 
quality. We find that both components are significant in tests, consistent with the discussion in Jayaraman (2008). 
7 Per DeFond (2010, 404): “Earnings restatements…are potentially attractive alternatives to abnormal accruals as a 
proxy for EQ [earnings quality]. One perceived advantage of restatements and AAERs over abnormal accruals is 
that they appear to be more direct proxies for EQ. Restatements and AAERs are actual events, rather than error 
terms from a statistical model that cannot be validated.” 
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use of tax accruals to manipulate earnings will introduce additional variation into GAAP ETRs. 
Therefore, if GAAP ETR smoothing through tax accruals is indicative of higher financial 
reporting quality, we will find a negative relation between our smoothing measure and fraudulent 
restatements, tax-related restatements, and equity decreasing restatements.  
Using restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality has shortcomings as well. 
The occurrence of a restatement is jointly determined by the violation of GAAP, auditors’ failure 
in detecting the violation, and the later discovery of misreporting (Gow et al. 2016). Although we 
control for firm characteristics that theoretically reflect audit quality and monitoring strength 
(e.g., firm size, profitability, and growth), we caution that we may be unable to completely 
isolate managers’ misreporting behavior. In addition, restatements only reflect discretionary 
reporting that violates GAAP, but does not reflect discretionary reporting within GAAP.  
To address these concerns, we also measure financial reporting quality using an 
alternative proxy: the informativeness of GAAP ETRs for future cash ETRs. We expect GAAP 
ETR smoothing to increase the ability of current GAAP ETRs to predict future cash ETRs. This 
measure avoids detection bias evident in restatements, plus it includes within-GAAP reporting 
discretion. We also use this measure since it is unclear whether the use of GAAP ETR smoothing 
to signal greater reporting quality will remove important variation in GAAP ETRs that would 
reduce their usefulness to investors. The shortcoming of this measure, however, is that it captures 
both managerial discretion and the effect of GAAP standards. Our use of both measures helps us 
triangulate the association between GAAP ETR smoothing and financial reporting quality.  
Regression Models 
Restatement Model 
 To empirically test whether GAAP ETR smoothing is associated with a lower likelihood 
of financial statement restatements (i.e., higher reporting quality), we estimate the following 
16 
 
logistic regression model (year and time subscripts suppressed): 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (1) 
𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽ଶ𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐵 + 𝛽ଷ𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽ସ𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽ହ𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂 + 𝛽଺𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐵_𝑆𝑀𝑂
+ ∑𝛽௝𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௝ +  𝜖 
 Our dependent variable Restatement is coded as one if any of the three-year period (t-2, t-
1, or t) had a restatement, and zero otherwise. We identify restatements using the Audit Analytics 
database, as we seek to capture a wide range of restatement events, and not simply those 
explicitly associated with fraud.8 Our primary variable of interest is GETR_SMO. If GAAP ETR 
smoothing is related to higher (lower) financial reporting quality through a lower (higher) 
likelihood of experiencing a restatement, then we expect 5<0 (5>0). 
We include control variables in Eq. (1) that potentially affect both ETR smoothing and 
the likelihood of restatement. All variables are calculated as the three-year average (period t-2, t-
1, and t) unless otherwise noted. To ensure that our measure of GAAP ETR smoothing is not 
being driven by underlying cash tax outcomes, we include both the level of current cash ETR 
(CETR) and the variance of cash ETR (VAR_CETR). Similarly, to ensure that our results are not 
driven by pre-tax performance, we control for the level (PTIB) and volatility (VAR_PTIB) of 
pretax income, as well as the level of pre-tax cash flows (PTCF).9 We control for pre-tax income 
smoothing (PTIB_SMO) to ensure that our results are truly related to ETR smoothing through 
                                                          
8 Karpoff et al. (2017) examine and compare four common financial misconduct databases. They suggest that Audit 
Analytics is ideal if trying to capture a wide range of events, and not simply those associated with fraud or SEC 
enforcement. Additionally, Audit Analytics is ideal for research questions requiring a significant quantity of data; 
our focus on multi-period GAAP ETR smoothing means that additional data is particularly valuable in ensuring that 
our tests have sufficient power. 
9 To calculate pre-tax income, we start from income before extraordinary items (Compustat variable IB) and add 
back tax expense (Compustat variable TXT) to capture all non-tax income smoothing from the ACEV measure in 
Jayaraman (2008). This is different than how we compute pre-tax income for our ETRs, which following prior 
literature starts from pre-tax income (Compustat variable PI). The only difference between these two definitions is 
the inclusion of minority interest adjustments in the first, but not the second, measure of pre-tax income. To ensure 
that our results are not affected by this difference in definition, we alternately replace (IB + TXT) with PI in 
computing PTIB, VAR_PTIB, and PTIB_SMO. Unreported results are nearly identical to the results we report. 
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tax accruals, rather than earnings smoothing through non-tax accruals. We control for the level of 
GAAP ETR as well, since prior literature examines the association between tax avoidance 
(measured in part as GAAP ETRs) and financial misreporting (e.g., Lennox et al. 2013).  
We also control for firm characteristics including profitability (ROA), size (SIZE), 
market-to-book (MB), leverage (LEV), R&D expense (R&D), the level (NOL) and change 
(NOL_DELTA) of net operating loss carryforwards, foreign income-producing activity (FOR), 
intangible assets (INTAN), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), capital intensity (PPE), cash 
holdings (CASH), the use of a Big-4 auditor (BIG4), losses (LOSS), and special items (SPI) 
(Lisowsky 2010; Cen et al. 2017). In addition, control for known predictors of restatements 
(Dechow et al. 2011), such as working capital accruals (RSST_ACC) as defined by Richardson 
et al. (2005), changes in accounts receivables (CH_REC), changes in inventory (CH_INV), the 
percentage of soft assets (SOFT_AT), changes in cash sales (CH_CS), changes in return on 
assets (CH_ROA), and securities issuances (ISSUE). All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent levels, mean-centered, and defined in Appendix A.10 
Future Cash/GAAP ETR Model 
 To strengthen the interpretation of our restatement tests as measuring financial reporting 
quality, we also test whether GAAP ETR smoothing makes current-period GAAP ETRs (GETR) 
more informative of future cash ETRs (CETR). To do so, we estimate the following OLS model 
(year and time subscripts suppressed): 
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅 = (2) 
𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽ଶ𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽ଷ𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂 + 𝛽ସ𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅 × 𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂 + ∑𝛽௝𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௝ + 𝜖 
                                                          
10 Additionally, for all our multivariate analyses, we cluster our standard errors by firm to address possible serial 
correlation in errors. We do not cluster by year since our panel effectively covers only 17 years and our panel is 
unbalanced, which provides insufficient dimensions to cluster by time (Cameron et al. 2011; Cameron and Miller 
2015). However, in untabulated tests we use standard errors that are clustered by both firm and year, and find that 
our results are unaffected. 
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 Our dependent variable Future_CETR is the average cash ETR (FAVG_CETR) 
calculated over the future 3 years (t+1, t+2, and t+3). We also use the average 3-year future 
GAAP ETR (FAVG_GETR) as an alternative dependent variable.  
Our primary variable of interest is the interaction between GETR and GETR_SMO.11 If 
GAAP ETR smoothing is indicative of higher (lower) financial reporting quality, then it will 
increase (decrease) the informativeness of GAAP ETRs for future cash ETRs, or 4>0 (4<0). 
We expect both current GAAP ETR and cash ETR to be positively associated with future cash 
ETR, or 1>0 and 2>0, consistent with Dyreng et al. (2008) and Hoopes et al. (2012). However, 
we make no prediction about the association between GETR_SMO and future cash ETRs (3).  
Similar to Eq. (1), we also include control variables that potentially affect both the levels 
of GAAP and cash ETRs and ETR smoothing. We include controls for level of current cash ETR 
(CETR), the variance of cash ETRs (VAR_CETR), the level (PTIB) and volatility (VAR_PTIB) 
of pretax income, the level of pre-tax cash flows (PTCF), pre-tax income smoothing 
(PTIB_SMO), and the interaction of GETR with VAR_CETR to ensure that our results are not 
driven by pre-tax performance, cash flows, or smoothing of non-tax accruals. We also control for 
all firm characteristic variables from Eq. (1).12 
In interpreting Eq. (2), we do not intend to show a causal effect, but rather to examine the 
association between GAAP ETRs and future cash ETRs as GAAP ETR smoothing increases. It 
is possible that GAAP ETR smoothing could alter how the tax department prepares its tax 
returns, thus indirectly affecting future cash ETRs. However, it is more likely that the estimation 
of tax accruals has no impact on underlying cash ETRs, but merely provides information about 
                                                          
11 Because our focus is on current-period GAAP ETRs, we define GETR and controls in Eq. (2) over one year. Our 
results are similar if we use a three-year average (period t-2, t-1, and t) in computing GETR and controls. 
12 In untabulated tests, we also include interactions between GETR and each of our control variables to ensure that 
our interaction of interest (GETR×GETR_SMO) is not capturing an interaction between GETR and another variable 
correlated with GETR_SMO. The significance and sign of our interaction of interest remains unchanged. 
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it. As such, a significantly positive (negative) coefficient on the interaction term indicates that 
smoothed GAAP ETRs are more (less) informative for future cash ETRs, but does not indicate 
that GAAP ETR smoothing has a causal effect on cash ETRs.  
Sample Selection  
We obtain our data from Compustat’s Snapshot database and merge it with restatement 
data from Audit Analytics.13 Our sample begins in 1994 to ensure the sample begins a full year 
after the implementation of SFAS 109, and end in 2015 due to data availability. We exclude 
financial and insurance (NAICS 52) and utility firms (NAICS 22), as they have different 
regulatory and tax rules than other firms. We require six years of consecutive data for any 
observation (i.e., for years t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2, and t+3) so that our smoothing measure and future 
cash ETRs can be calculated. We also exclude observations with abnormal ETR values, defined 
as having a GAAP ETR of 1 and cash ETR of 0 (or vice versa) for any year in their GETR_SMO 
calculation period.14 Finally, we require that years t-2, t-1, and t have all control variables 
available.15 Our final sample consists of 35,201 firm year observations from 1996 to 2012. The 
                                                          
13 Compustat’s Snapshot database provides the originally filed financial statement numbers before adjusting for 
subsequent restatements. We use this database so our smoothing measures capture the original ETRs provided by 
managers in the original financial statement filing, as these ETRs are most likely to contain managers’ intended 
smoothing. Our inferences remain unchanged if we instead use the traditional Compustat database, which contains 
updates for restated numbers. 
14 These observations are likely caused by either an extreme event or having pre-tax income, tax expense, and cash 
taxes paid all close to 0. As a result, our inferences could be influenced by minor changes in any of these items. 
Nevertheless, we find that our results are quantitatively similar when these abnormal ETR observations remain. 
15 Studies that examine ETRs (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Demeré et al. 2017) typically omit loss firms, as a negative 
ETR denominator leads to ETRs that are not meaningful. We retain loss firms as we are interested in the predictive 
ability of GAAP ETR smoothing, and the smoothing measure (along with ETR variability) is not affected by 
negative ETR denominators. Nevertheless, in untabulated tests, we remove observations that have negative pre-tax 
income at any point in the three-year ETR smoothing period. We find that our results and inferences are robust to 
the exclusion of these observations, except that we no longer find a statistically significant association between 
GAAP ETR smoothing and non-tax restatements. However, firms close to recording a loss have significant 
incentives to manage earnings to avoid a loss (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). As such, these firms that want to 
signal that they are not giving in to their earnings management incentives likely have the greatest signaling value to 
GAAP ETR smoothing, and this filter also removes the firms most likely to have a strong negative association 
between GAAP ETR smoothing and restatement likelihood. Otherwise, our results generalize to the sample of firms 
typically examined in prior research. We also find that our results are robust to requiring all observations to have un-
winsorized GAAP ETRs between 0 and 1. 
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number of firms fluctuates between 1,654 and 2,269 (in 1996 and 2003, respectively), with each 
year representing no more than 6.4 percent of the total sample. The number of firms each year is 
consistent with other recent studies (Hoopes et al. 2012; Demeré et al. 2017). 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 reports our descriptive statistics of firm-level characteristics. Our sample has a 
mean value of Restatement of 0.19, indicating that about 19 percent of our observations 
experience a restatement in the current or prior two years. While prior literature typically finds a 
lower restatement likelihood in their sample (Hobson et al. 2012; Cao et al. 2012; Francis et al. 
2013), this is likely caused because by these studies using single years as observations, rather 
than three-year periods. Multiplying the restatement likelihoods in prior literature by three gives 
a likelihood closer to 0.19, where firms with multiple restatements in a three-year period could 
be responsible for why the restatement likelihood we observe is less than three times the single-
year likelihood observed in prior literature. 
Our GAAP ETR smoothing variable (GETR_SMO) has a mean of 0.014 and a median of 
0.002. This variable is more often positive (63 percent of observations) than negative or zero (31 
and 6 percent of observations, respectively).16 Our cash and GAAP ETRs have means of 0.20 
and 0.26, respectively, which are slightly lower than those found in recent research (e.g., Ciconte 
et al. 2016; Mayberry et al. 2015). However, this study has seven and two times, respectively, the 
number of observations of those studies; by utilizing more observations, our study likely includes 
smaller firms, which is evidenced by a slightly lower mean of the natural log of assets of 5.75. 
                                                          
16 The 6 percent of observations for which GETR_SMO equals zero are generally those with either negative or 
extreme positive GAAP tax expense and cash taxes paid over the three-year window. Because we winsorize all 
ETRs to lie between 0 and 1 before computing ETR variances, these observations exhibit no variation, leading to a 
GETR_SMO value of zero. Our results and inferences are unchanged when we remove these observations. 
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Taken together with a positive correlation between CETR and Size (see Table 2), we would 
expect our ETR means to be lower than other studies. Descriptive statistics on other variables are 
similar to those in prior studies (Jayaraman 2008; Dechow et al. 2011; Akamah et al. 2016). 
 Table 2 shows Pearson correlations of key variables used in our regressions. 
GETR_SMO is significantly and negatively correlated with Restatement, which is consistent 
with GAAP ETR smoothing indicating higher financial reporting quality. However, because both 
Restatement and GETR_SMO are significantly correlated with key control variables, we do not 
derive inferences from these univariate results. We also cannot derive inferences from this table 
with regards to Eq. (2) on the informativeness of GAAP ETR for future cash ETR, as testing this 
relation requires an interaction between GETR and GETR_SMO. 
Multivariate Results 
Primary Restatement Results 
We begin our multivariate analyses by investigating whether smoothing through tax 
accruals is positively or negatively related to financial reporting restatements. Table 3 reports the 
results of testing our hypothesis. As shown in column (1), we find that GETR_SMO is 
significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of having a restatement, consistent 
with ETR smoothing indicating higher quality financial reporting. Economically, we estimate 
that a one standard deviation increase in GETR_SMO about its mean is associated with a 1.3 
percent reduction in the likelihood of experiencing a restatement. Given that the mean 
restatement likelihood in our sample is 19 percent, our estimate represents an economically 
significant 6.7 percent reduction in the base restatement likelihood. Separately, we find that 
VAR_CETR is positively associated with restatement risk, consistent with cash ETR variance 
indicating some degree of tax risk (Guenther et al. 2016). We also find that the coefficient on 
pre-tax earnings smoothing (PTIB_SMO) is statistically insignificant, consistent with previous 
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mixed results that cannot clearly answer whether overall earnings smoothing is associated with 
financial reporting quality. This result provides support for how the tax setting is unique to 
provide new evidence on whether smoothing activities indicate higher or lower earnings quality. 
However, given that 19 percent of our sample experiences a restatement in a three-year 
period, it suggests that a restatement is not a particularly uncommon occurrence. Some 
restatements may be due to less severe misapplications of GAAP, while others are results of 
fraudulent reporting. To investigate whether the association between GAAP ETR smoothing and 
restatement varies with the nature and severity of misreporting, we separately examine 
restatements where the SEC did not identify fraudulent intent (less severe) and those where the 
SEC did identify fraudulent intent (more severe). As shown in columns (2) and (3), GAAP ETR 
smoothing is negatively associated with the likelihood of experiencing both a non-fraud and 
fraud related restatement, respectively.17 Thus, GAAP ETR smoothing helps to identify less (i.e., 
non-fraudulent) and more (i.e., fraudulent) severe financial reporting issues. 
Next, because GETR_SMO is a measure of tax smoothing, we split restatements into 
those with a tax related restatement issue versus those without to examine whether GAAP ETR 
smoothing only identifies the quality of tax expense, or whether GAAP ETR smoothing might 
act as a signal of a broader commitment by a firm to have high-quality financial reporting. In 
columns (4), (5), and (6), we find that GETR_SMO is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of experiencing a tax-related restatement, whether fraudulent or not. These results support that 
                                                          
17 The total number of observations in any column of Table 3 may deviate from our full sample used in Column 1. 
This deviation occurs because we drop observations with the opposite type of restatement, so that we are truly 
comparing non-fraud restatement observations to only non-restatement observations, or tax restatement observations 
to only non-restatement observations. For example, the 246 fraud observations in Column 3 are removed from the 
sample in Column 2, while the 6,459 non-fraud restatement observations in Column 2 are removed from the sample 
in Column 3. We also require that each non-restatement observation have at least one restatement observation in the 
same industry or year to be included in the sample, which results in a reduction in non-restatement observations in 
some tests. We add this filter so our restatement and control firms are similar on industry and year dimensions. 
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GAAP ETR smoothing may act as a signal that managers will not manipulate tax accruals that 
erode the quality of tax-related financial reporting (e.g., managing overall earnings; Dhaliwal et 
al. 2004). Economically, we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in GETR_SMO 
about its mean is associated with a 0.5 percent reduction in the likelihood of experiencing a tax-
related restatement, or a 12.8 percent reduction relative to the conditional tax restatement 
probability.18 Specific to tax-related fraud, we find that a one standard deviation increase in 
GETR_SMO about its mean is associated with a 0.001 percent reduction in the likelihood of 
experiencing a restatement related to tax fraud, or a 47 percent reduction relative to the 
conditional tax fraud probability.19 
In columns (7), (8), and (9), we find that GETR_SMO is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of experiencing a non-tax-related restatement as well, although only when the 
restatement is not fraudulent. From an economic standpoint, we estimate that a one standard 
deviation increase in GETR_SMO about its mean is associated with a 0.8 percent reduction in 
the likelihood of experiencing a non-tax restatement, or a 6.3 percent reduction relative to the 
conditional non-tax restatement probability.20 While it may not seem intuitive that smoothing of 
ETRs using tax accruals indicates the quality of non-tax earnings components, this result is 
consistent with managers using GAAP ETR smoothing to commit to not managing earnings 
using one of the most readily available earnings management tools—tax accruals (Dhaliwal et al. 
                                                          
18 As a baseline, we use the conditional tax restatement likelihood, or the likelihood a tax restatement at half a 
standard deviation below the mean (i.e., the starting point in our GETR_SMO increase) conditional on all controls 
being at their mean. Relative to the unconditional subsample mean tax restatement likelihood, this is an 8.5 percent 
reduction. All conditional likelihoods are computed using the margins command in Stata. 
19 As a baseline, we use the conditional tax fraud likelihood, which is the likelihood of a tax fraud at half a standard 
deviation below the mean (i.e., the starting point in our GETR_SMO increase) conditional on all controls being at 
their mean. Relative to the unconditional subsample mean tax fraud likelihood, this is a 1 percent reduction. 
20 As a baseline, we use the conditional non-tax restatement likelihood, which is the likelihood a non-tax restatement 
at half a standard deviation below the mean (i.e., the starting point in our GETR_SMO increase) conditional on all 
controls being at their mean. Relative to the unconditional subsample mean non-tax restatement likelihood, this is a 
4.6 percent reduction. 
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2004; Krull 2004). This commitment in turn suggests that managers are devoted to faithfully 
reporting other components of earnings, and not simply the tax components.21 However, this 
strategy only works when managers are not willing to engage in fraudulent reporting.  
Overall, these results are consistent with GAAP ETR smoothing being associated with 
higher financial reporting quality. That the coefficient on pre-tax income smoothing is positive 
and not significant across all our tests also supports that smoothing of GAAP ETRs acts as a 
unique indicator of financial reporting quality, whereas overall earnings smoothing do not.  
Future Cash/GAAP ETR Informativeness Results 
 Our results from Table 3 suggest that GAAP ETR smoothing is used to signal higher 
quality of tax (and non-tax) reporting in financial statements in the context of compliance with 
GAAP. We now investigate whether GAAP ETR smoothing through tax accruals is informative 
of future cash ETR outcomes. As discussed in Section IV, measuring the strength of this relation 
serves as an alternative measure of financial reporting quality to restatements, providing 
additional evidence on the relation between GAAP ETR smoothing and reporting quality. Table 
4 reports the results of these tests. 
To provide a baseline analysis, we first examine whether GAAP ETRs are informative 
about future cash ETRs incremental to current cash ETRs.22 We interpret the coefficient on 
GETR as testing whether tax accruals (as a main effect) are significantly informative of future 
cash ETRs. The statistically positive signs on GETR in columns (1) and (2) support that tax 
accruals are incrementally informative of future levels of cash ETRs beyond current cash ETRs. 
                                                          
21 An alternate hypothesis that is not born out by our data would be that managers use GAAP ETR smoothing to 
falsely signal commitment to earnings quality in an attempt to throw investors and others off the scent of a non-tax 
earnings management scheme. However, this strategizing is most likely to be prevalent when managers are aware of 
severe consequences to their actions, which may be why we fail to find results for non-tax fraud restatements. 
22 We provide this baseline analysis because we are aware of no prior study that has shown that GAAP ETRs are 
incrementally informative about future cash ETRs. 
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 However, we are primarily interested in whether the smoothing of tax accruals within 
GAAP ETRs makes those tax accruals more informative about future cash ETRs (an interactive 
effect). Our first estimation of Eq. (2) includes only GAAP ETR (GETR), cash ETR (CETR), 
GAAP ETR smoothing (GETR_SMO), and the interaction between GAAP ETR and GAAP ETR 
smoothing (GETR×GETR_SMO), as well as cash ETR variance (VAR_CETR), the interaction 
between GAAP ETR and cash ETR variance (GETR×VAR_CETR), and industry and year fixed 
effects. As shown in column (3), the interaction between GETR and GETR_SMO is significantly 
positive, indicating that smoothing of tax accruals makes GAAP ETRs incrementally more 
informative of future levels of cash ETRs for the subsequent three-year period.23  
 In column (4) we re-estimate Eq. (2) after adding control variables. We find similar 
results in both sign and significance for our key independent variables (GETR, CETR, 
GETR_SMO, and GETR×GETR_SMO), indicating that our results are robust to controls used in 
the extant literature. Overall, we find evidence that the smoothing of tax accruals makes GAAP 
ETRs incrementally informative about future cash ETRs.24 
 In a related test, we examine whether smoother GAAP ETRs are more informative in 
predicting future GAAP (rather than cash) ETRs. In column (5), we similarly find that smoother 
                                                          
23 We also find a significantly negative interaction between GETR and VAR_CETR, which is consistent with 
fundamental cash tax smoothness being associated with more informative GAAP ETRs. However, 
GETR×GETR_SMO remains incrementally significant to the effects of fundamental cash tax smoothness, 
suggesting that it has a significant role in the informativeness of GAAP ETRs. We do not include VAR_GETR in 
the specification to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
24 In untabulated tests we run specification checks that use ranked variables to rule out the possibility that outliers 
are driving our results by ranking our dependent and independent variables based on the entire sample and divide by 
our sample size so that our ranked variables vary between 0 and 1. This “global ranked” estimation model yields 
similar significant results for the interaction between GETR and GETR_SMO. Additionally, we rank our dependent 
and independent variables within each year and industry, and divide by the total observations in that year and 
industry so that our ranked variables are between 0 and 1. Our by-industry, by-year ranked model yields similar 
results for the interaction between GETR and GETR_SMO. In both ranked analyses, all coefficients generally retain 
the same sign and significance, consistent with prior research, except that the signs on the main effect of 
VAR_CETR become positive when ranked variables are used. This result suggests that care should be taken when 
using VAR_CETR in future research as inferences may be susceptible to outlier observations. 
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GAAP ETRs are more informative for future GAAP ETRs.25 Also note that the insignificant sign 
on the variance of pretax income (VAR_PTIB) in our extended models (i.e., columns (4) and (5)) 
indicates that our results are not driven by underlying earnings smoothness.26 
In untabulated results, we standardize all of our variables to enable direct comparisons 
across coefficients. These results show that a one standard deviation change in smoothing at the 
mean makes GAAP ETRs 31 percent more informative about future cash ETRs, which is an 
economically significant increase in informativeness. 
The Effect of Managerial Discretion 
 Our results so far indicate that GAAP ETR smoothing is associated with greater reporting 
quality both by signaling reduced restatement risk and making GAAP ETRs more informative 
about future cash tax outcomes. As described in Section IV, an association with greater reporting 
quality along both these dimensions, as well as the strong association with fraudulent 
misreporting involving tax issues, suggests that our results are driven primarily by managers’ 
reporting discretion. To further support this inference, we also investigate how our results vary 
with managerial intent, the amount of discretion in tax reporting, and the demand for higher 
earnings and tax reporting quality. We focus only on restatements (i.e., Eq. (1)) in our cross-
sectional analyses because GAAP standards, which may also vary cross-sectionally, play a role 
in the informativeness of ETR smoothing on future cash tax outcomes.  
                                                          
25 For brevity, we only tabulate the results using future three-year average cash and GAAP ETRs as our dependent 
variable. Results using cash or GAAP ETRs for each individual future year (t+1, t+2, t+3) are similar. 
26 To verify that GAAP ETR smoothing improves the prediction of future cash ETR, we also conduct untabulated 
out-of-sample prediction tests. Using an approach similar to prior research (e.g., Lev et al. 2010; Ciconte et al. 
2016), we estimate industry-specific coefficients for Eq. (1), both with and without GETR_SMO. We develop our 
estimates using observations during 1994-2007 and compute firm-specific unsigned prediction errors 
(𝐹𝐴𝑉𝐺_𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅 − 𝐹𝐴𝑉𝐺_𝐶෢ 𝐸𝑇𝑅) using a “hold-out” sample of data from 2008-2014. For the final step, we test the 
distribution of the prediction errors across the two models (with and without GETR_SMO). If GETR_SMO 
improves the predictability of future levels of cash ETR, then we expect significantly smaller absolute prediction 
errors when the prediction models include GETR_SMO and its interaction with GETR. The mean and median tests 
indicate that Eq. (1) generates significantly smaller absolute errors when GETR_SMO and its interaction with 
GETR are included, suggesting that smoothing through tax accruals helps predict future cash ETRs. 
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 We begin by splitting restatement observations by the net impact to shareholder equity 
caused by the restatement. Because negative impacts to shareholder equity in restatements are 
caused by the unwinding of inflated earnings in restated period(s), these are the restatements 
more likely caused by managers’ discretionary reporting choices. Thus, the ability of GAAP 
ETR smoothing to indicate earnings quality is expected to be more prominent in the sub-sample 
of restatements with a negative impact to shareholder equity.  
 In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we separately examine our restatement results after 
splitting restatements into those with (i) negative and (ii) positive or zero impacts to shareholder 
equity. We find that GETR_SMO is negatively associated with restatement likelihood only for 
restatements resulting in a negative shareholder equity change, consistent with the association 
between ETR smoothing through tax accruals and reporting quality being the result of intentional 
managerial reporting choices. We repeat similar analyses for tax-related restatements in columns 
(3) and (4), and again find that GAAP ETR smoothing is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of having a tax-related restatement only when the restatement has a negative impact 
on shareholder equity (i.e., is most likely the result of managerial discretion to inflate earnings). 
We also examine non-tax restatements in columns (5) and (6); however, we fail to find a 
difference in the signaling ability of GAAP ETR smoothing for non-tax restatements between 
restatements with negative versus zero/positive net impacts on shareholder equity.27 
To further examine the role of managerial discretion, we separate our smoothing measure 
into discretionary and non-discretionary components and compare the ability of the two 
smoothing components to signal greater reporting quality. To achieve this separation, we use 
three discretionary smoothing models. Our first model regresses GETR_SMO on the seven 
                                                          
27 In untabulated analyses, we do not find any difference in the signaling ability of GAAP ETR smoothing for 
restatements with zero effects and positive impacts on shareholder equity, and so report them together. 
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innate firm attributes from Mayberry et al. (2015) for each industry-year with at least 10 
observations.28 Following the creation of a discretionary smoothness measure in Mayberry et al. 
(2015), we use the predicted value from this regression as our measure of non-discretionary 
smoothing, and the residuals as our measure of discretionary smoothing.29 Our second method 
uses the simple mean of GETR_SMO by industry-year as an estimate of non-discretionary 
smoothing, and a firm’s deviation from this mean as discretionary smoothing. Our third method 
uses the simple mean of a firm’s GETR_SMO over its own time-series as an estimate of non-
discretionary smoothing, and deviations from this mean as discretionary smoothing. We argue 
that ETR smoothing that cannot be explained by fundamentals, i.e., smoothing that deviates from 
industry or firms’ own historical averages, is more likely to reflect managerial discretion than the 
remaining portion. 30,31 Table 6 reports our tests of discretionary vs. non-discretionary smoothing 
informativeness. Across columns (1) through (3), we find that only our estimated discretionary 
ETR smoothing (GETR_SMO_D) is negatively associated with restatement likelihood, 
consistent with this association being driven by manager’s discretionary reporting choices. 
                                                          
28 Mayberry et al. (2015) use these seven factors as they (a) follow a long literature that uses them to represent 
innate accounting system factors (e.g., Francis et al. 2004) and (b) are adjusted to be specific to the tax setting. All 
inferences remain if we use cut-offs of at least 20, 50, or 100 observations. 
29 Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂௜௧ =  𝛽௝𝑋௝௜௧ +  𝜖௜௧, where X is a vector of the seven 
innate accounting system factors from Mayberry et al. (2015). Our measure of discretionary smoothing is 
𝐷_𝑆𝑀𝑂௜௧ =  𝜖௜௧, while our measure of non-discretionary smoothing is 𝑁𝐷_𝑆𝑀𝑂௜௧ =  𝛽௝𝑋௝௜௧ . See Appendix B. 
30 In addition to the models used in this paper, we also (a) separately used firm fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects in the Mayberry et al. (2015) model; (b) used the Desai and Dharmapala (2006) model to split tax accruals 
into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals before computing ETR smoothing; and (c) incorporated additional 
factors from Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Francis et al. (2004) into the Mayberry et al. (2015) model. Our 
inferences remain qualitatively similar using these alternative models. 
31 We do not use the Choudhary et al. (2016) measure of tax accrual quality to compute discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals, as this method classifies tax accruals that are orthogonal to tax cash flows as discretionary. In 
our setting, this effectively results in decomposing GAAP ETR smoothing into its two sources of volatility: the 
variance of tax accrual ETRs (classified as discretionary) and the covariance between cash ETRs and tax accrual 
ETRs (classified as non-discretionary). However, both of these volatility sources can be affected by discretionary 
reporting choices and innate, non-discretionary firm characteristics. In a supplemental analysis reported below, we 
separately examine how these different sources of variability affect our results. Consistent with our results here, we 
find that (1) smoothing through “discretionary” tax accrual ETR variance and (2) smoothing through the “non-
discretionary” covariance between cash ETRs and tax accrual ETRs both make GAAP ETRs more informative. 
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In the last two columns of Table 6, we examine how the negative association between 
GAAP ETR smoothing and restatements varies in two settings where managers likely have 
greater tax accrual reporting discretion: (1) firms with significant foreign operations and (2) 
firms with intangible assets (including R&D).32 We define a firm as having significant foreign 
operations (Foreign) when more than 5 percent of its pretax income is from foreign sources and 
define firms as having intangible assets (RD_Intan) when they report non-zero intangible assets 
or R&D spending. Consistent with our prior results, we find in columns (4) and (5) that the 
association between GAAP ETR smoothing and restatements is more negative when managers 
have more discretion with tax accrual reporting (i.e., have significant foreign activities and 
intangible assets). Together, these analyses suggest that our results are driven by managers using 
discretion in tax accruals to smooth GAAP ETRs as an indicator of greater reporting quality. 
 Finally, while the previous results suggest that managers use the discretion available to 
them in tax accruals to exhibit reporting quality through ETR smoothing, managers do not make 
these reporting decisions in a vacuum. We expect that managers are more likely to use ETR 
smoothing as an indicator of higher reporting quality when there is stronger external monitoring 
and a demand for higher financial reporting quality and low tax reporting opacity. To measure 
external monitoring and demand, we split our sample into observations with an above- or below-
median institutional ownership percentage, and also into observations which do or do not have 
analysts covering the firm in any period t-2, t-1, or t. We report results from these tests in Table 
7. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the negative association between GAAP ETR smoothing 
and restatements is stronger when a firm has greater institutional ownership and when it is 
                                                          
32 Firms with foreign operations report tax accruals that domestic-only firms do not, including permanently 
reinvested earnings designations and foreign-tax uncertain tax benefits, which are subject to considerable managerial 
discretion (Krull 2004; Cazier et al. 2015). Firms with more intangible assets may have unique tax accruals (e.g., 
related to book-tax differences in mergers and acquisitions) and have a greater ability to manage tax accruals 
through cross-border income shifting (Grubert 2003; Demeré and Gramlich 2017; Hopland et al. 2017). 
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followed by financial analysts. The variation of informativeness of ETR smoothing with external 
monitoring further supports our interpretation that managers’ discretionary reporting plays the 
key role in how ETR smoothing is linked to higher reporting quality. 
Untabulated Supplemental Analyses 
To further examine the information inherent in our measure of GAAP ETR smoothing, 
we decompose GAAP ETR smoothing into its two sources of volatility: (i) the variance of tax 
accrual ETRs and (ii) the covariance between cash ETRs and tax accrual ETRs. In untabulated 
results, we successively re-estimate Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) by replacing GETR_SMO with each of 
these sources.33 The results are similar to the reported results in Tables 3 and 4, in that both the 
variance and covariance portions of GAAP ETR smoothing are important in signaling reporting 
quality and improving the informativeness of GAAP ETRs for future cash ETRs. These results 
support the argument in Jayaraman (2008) that both elements are necessary to infer smoothing. 
Second, we decompose GAAP ETR smoothing into its reporting components, or 
smoothing from current versus deferred GAAP ETR. If only one component of GAAP ETR is 
significant, then we can gain a better understanding of the specific tax accruals used to 
informatively smooth GAAP ETRs. In untabulated results, we successively re-estimate Eq. (1) 
and (2) by replacing total GETR_SMO with smoothing in current GAAP ETRs and smoothing in 
deferred GAAP ETRs.34 For Eq. (1), we find that smoothing attributable to the deferred GAAP 
ETR is most strongly associated with restatement likelihood, suggesting that deferred tax assets/ 
liabilities and potentially permanently reinvested earnings designations are the tax accruals most 
                                                          
33 Covariance of cash ETR and tax accruals is calculated as 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃 𝐸𝑇𝑅) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑇𝑅) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠]) for periods t-2, t-1, and t. 
34 These measures are constructed similarly to GETR_SMO, namely as the variance of the current (deferred) ETR 
less the variance of the cash ETR (CETR) for periods t-2, t-1, and t. Here the current (deferred) ETR is constructed 
as ஼௨௥௥௘௡௧ ்௔௫ ா௫௣௘௡௦௘೟
௉௥௘௧௔௫ ஻௢௢௞ ூ௡௖௢௠௘೟ 
 (஽௘௙௘௥௥௘ௗ ்௔௫ ா௫௣௘௡௦௘೟
௉௥௘௧௔௫ ஻௢௢௞ ூ௡௖௢௠௘೟ 
). However, we caveat that we cannot identify current and deferred 
portions of cash ETR. 
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likely to be used to smooth GAAP ETRs to signal reporting quality. For Eq. (2), however, we 
find that both smoothing components yield significant coefficients on their interaction with 
GETR with the same sign and significance as the original GAAP ETR smoothing measure. This 
finding is consistent with smoothing in both current and deferred ETRs helping to provide 
information about future cash tax outcomes. 
Third, Brown et al. (2016) provide evidence of a shift around the passage of FIN 48 in 
the way that some managers’ bonuses vary with ETRs. They find that bonuses in the pre-FIN 48 
period are associated with GAAP ETRs but not cash ETRs, but this result reverses in the post-
FIN 48 period. We re-estimate Eq. (1) and (2) separately on the pre- and post-FIN 48 periods and 
find results across the periods that are consistent with our main tests.35 We infer that managers’ 
compensation-related motives do not solely drive our results. 
Fourth, we test whether the informativeness of GAAP ETR smoothing varies with a 
firm’s tax avoidance. In untabulated tests, we re-estimate Eq. (1) and (2) separately for firms in 
the highest, middle, and lowest tercile of cash ETR relative to the firm’s industry average cash 
ETR.36 We find that our results are similar within each tercile, indicating both that (a) our results 
are likely not affected by tax planning, as intended by the construction of our smoothing measure 
in which we subtract the volatility of cash ETR and (b) GAAP ETR smoothing as a financial 
reporting strategy appears to be available to firms regardless of their level of cash tax avoidance. 
Finally, we test whether the informativeness of GAAP ETR smoothing varies with a 
firm’s pretax earnings smoothing. In untabulated tests, we re-estimate Eq. (1) and (2) separately 
for firms in each tercile of pretax income smoothing. We find that our results are similar within 
each tercile, indicating both that (a) our results are not a mechanical by-product of pretax 
                                                          
35 We find no significant difference in our results between the pre- and post-FIN 48 periods. 
36 Terciles are determined based on the firm cash ETR minus its industry average cash ETR. This test is roughly 
equivalent to interacting all variables by CETR, including GETR*GETR_SMO. 
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earnings smoothing and (b) GAAP ETR smoothing as a financial reporting strategy appears to be 
available to firms regardless of their pretax earnings smoothing opportunities or strategies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 An open question in financial accounting is whether smoothing activities are associated 
with higher or lower financial reporting quality (Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008; 
McInnis 2010; Dechow et al. 2010). This study uses unique features in the tax setting to provide 
new evidence on this issue. We argue that the smoothing of ETRs is incompatible with earnings 
manipulations and investors put a greater emphasis on the stability of ETR reporting than on 
other costs. These unique features of ETR reporting make ETR smoothing potentially different 
from overall earnings smoothing in their relation to financial reporting quality.  
We find that different from earnings smoothing, which is unrelated to the likelihood of 
restatement, smoothing through tax accruals is associated with a significantly lower likelihood of 
financial restatement, particularly tax-related financial reporting fraud and income-inflating 
restatements. Such negative associations are also stronger when there is a higher level of 
discretion in tax reporting (i.e., related to foreign operations and R&D/intangibles) and stronger 
external monitoring (i.e., more institutional ownership and analyst following). This evidence 
suggests that the ETR smoothing is mostly driven by managers’ discretionary reporting of tax 
accruals. We also document that smoothing through tax accruals increases the informativeness of 
GAAP ETRs for predicting future cash and GAAP ETRs.  
Our findings suggest that smoothing of GAAP ETRs through tax accruals serves as a 
credible indicator of overall higher financial reporting quality, both in reducing financial 
restatements and better revealing future tax cash outcomes. Collectively, our results contribute to 
the financial reporting and tax literatures by providing evidence that GAAP ETR smoothing, 
different from pretax income smoothing, is consistent with higher financial reporting quality. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
Restatement Indicator of financial statement restatement, coded as one if period t-2, t-1, or t 
has a restatement, zero otherwise. 
FAVG_CETR Future 3-Year Average Year Cash Effective Tax Rate, computed as the Sum of 
[Cash Taxes Paid (TXPD) ÷ Pretax Income (PI) for periods t+1, t+2, & t+3] ÷ 
3 
FAVG_GETR Future 3-Year Average Year GAAP Effective Tax Rate, computed as the Sum 
of [Total Tax Expense (TXT) ÷ Pretax Income (PI) for periods t+1, t+2, & t+3] 
÷ 3 
Independent Variables 
 GETR GAAP Effective Tax Rate, computed as Total Tax Expense (TXT) ÷ Pretax 
Income (PI), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 CETR Cash Effective Tax Rate, computed as Cash Taxes Paid (TXPD) ÷ Pretax 
Income (PI), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 PTIB Pre-Tax Income, computed as [Income Before Extraordinary Items (IB) + 
Total Tax Expense (TXT)] ÷ prior-period Total Assets (AT) averaged over 
periods t−2, t−1, & t. 
 PTCF Pre-Tax Cash Flows, computed as, computed as Cash Flows (OANCF) + Cash 
Taxes Paid (TXPD) ÷ prior-period Total Assets (AT) averaged over periods 
t−2, t−1, & t. 
 GETR_SMO Tax Accrual Smoothing, computed as −1 × [Variance of GAAP Effective Tax 
Rate (GETR) − Variance of Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR)] for periods t−2, 
t−1, & t.  
PTIB_SMO Pre-Tax Income Smoothing, computed as −1 × [Variance of Pre-Tax Income 
(PTIB) − Variance of Pre-Tax Cash Flows (PTCF)] for periods t−2, t−1, & t. 
 VAR_CETR Variance of Cash Effective Tax Rate, computed as Variance of [Cash Taxes 
Paid (TXPD) ÷ Pretax Income (PI)] for periods t−2, t−1, & t. 
 VAR_GETR Variance of GAAP Effective Tax Rate, computed as Variance of [Total Tax 
Expense (TXT) ÷ Pretax Income (PI)] for periods t−2, t−1, & t. 
 VAR_PTCF Variance of Pre-Tax Cash Flows, computed as Variance of [[Cash Flows 
(OANCF) + Cash Taxes Paid (TXPD)] ÷ prior-period Total Assets (AT)] for 
periods t−2, t−1, & t. 
 VAR_PTIB Variance of Pre-Tax Income, computed as Variance of [[Income Before 
Extraordinary Items (IB) + Total Tax Expense (TXT)] ÷ prior-period Total 
Assets (AT)] for periods t−2, t−1, & t. 
Control Variables 
 ROA Return on Assets, computed as the ratio of Pretax Income (PI) ÷ Total Assets 
(AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 MB Market to Book ratio, computed as [Common Shares Outstanding (CSHO) × 
End of Fiscal Year Stock Price (PRCC_F)] ÷ Common Equity Book Value 
(CEQ). Negative values are recorded as missing, averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 SIZE Firm Size, computed as the natural log of [one plus Total Assets (AT)], 
averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 LEV Leverage, computed as the ratio of Long-Term Debt (DLTT) ÷ Total Assets 
(AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
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 R&D Research & Development, computed as the ratio of Research Expense (XRD) 
÷ prior-period Total Assets (AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. Missing values in 
Compustat are recoded as $0. 
 NOL Net Operating Loss Carryforward, coded as one if Tax Loss Carryforward 
(TLCF) is non-zero in t-2, t-1, or t and not missing; zero otherwise. 
 NOL_DELTA Change in NOL indicator above from previous period, calculated as current-
period NOL minus period-period NOL. 
 FOR Foreign Activity, computed as Foreign Pretax Income (PIFO) ÷ prior-period 
Total Assets (AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. Missing values in Compustat are 
recoded as $0. 
 INTAN Intangible Assets, computed as Intangibles (INTAN) ÷ Total Assets (AT), 
averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 M&A Mergers and Acquisitions, coded as one if M&A (AQC) is non-zero in t-2, t-1, 
or t and not missing; zero otherwise. 
 PPE Property, Plant, & Equipment, computed as the ratio of Property, Plant & 
Equipment (PPEGT) divided by Total Assets (AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 CASH Cash Holdings, computed as cash and short-term investments (CHE) ÷ Total 
Assets (AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 BIG4 Big Four Auditor of the financial statements, coded as one if one of the Big 
Four Auditors audited the financial statements in t-2, t-1, or t; zero otherwise. 
 LOSS Loss Year, coded as one if Income Before Extraordinary Items (IB) is negative 
in t-2, t-1, or t; zero otherwise. 
 SPI Special Items, coded as one if Special Items (SPI) is non-zero in t-2, t-1, or t; 
zero otherwise. 
 RSST_ACC Working capital accruals which include changes in long-term operating assets 
and long-term operating liabilities as defined by Richardson et al. (2005). 
 CH_REC Change in accounts receivable, computed as current period Receivables 
(RECT) less prior period Receivables (RECT) ÷ Total Assets (AT), averaged 
over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 CH_INV Change in inventory, computed as current period Inventory (INVT) less prior 
period Inventory (INVT) ÷ Total Assets (AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 SOFT_AT Ratio of soft assets, computed as Total Assets (AT) less Net Property, Plant & 
Equipment (PPENT) less Cash and Cash Equivalents (CHE) ÷ Total Assets 
(AT), averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 CH_CS Percentage change in cash sales, Sales (SALE) less [current period Receivables 
(RECT) less prior period Receivables (RECT)], averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 CH_ROA Return on Assets, computed as Earnings (EARN) / [current period Total Assets 
(AT) less prior period Total Assets (AT)] less prior period Earnings (EARN) / 
[prior period Total Assets (AT) less second-prior period Total Assets (AT)], 
averaged over t-2, t-1, & t. 
 ISSUE Actual issuance, coded as one if Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (SSTK) 
or Long-Term Debt Issuance (DLTIS) is greater than zero in t-2, t-1, or t; zero 
otherwise. 
 
Non-Discretionary and Discretionary Smoothing Variables 
 ND_SMO Non-Discretionary Smoothing, estimated the following three ways: 
Model 1 – Mayberry et al. (2015) Smoothing: the fitted value from the 
following OLS regression model, estimated using individual regressions by 
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each industry-year combination for which there are at least 10 observations: 
𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁௜,௧ 
        + 𝛽ସ𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑇𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸௜,௧ + 𝛽଺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ + 𝛽଻𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸_𝑉𝑂𝐿௜,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧.  
Model 2 – Industry-Year Average Smoothing: the simple average of our 
GETR_SMO measure (i.e., 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒[𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂௜]), estimated over firms 
within each industry-year with at least 10 GETR_SMO observations. 
Model 3 – Firm Average Smoothing: the simple average of our GETR_SMO 
measure (i.e., 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒[𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝑀𝑂௧]), estimated over time for each firm with 
at least 3 GETR_SMO observations. 
 D_SMO Discretionary Smoothing, estimated the following three ways: 
Model 1 – Residual from Mayberry et al. (2015) Smoothing: the residual value 
from the ND_SMO Model 1 above. 
Model 2 – Departure from Industry-Year Average Smoothing: firm’s 
GETR_SMO measure at time t minus its industry-year’s average level of 
GETR_SMO in the same period, as calculated in ND_SMO Model 2 above. 
Model 3 – Departure from Firm Average Smoothing: firm’s GETR_SMO 
measure at time t minus its time-series average level of GETR_SMO, as 
calculated in ND_SMO Model 3 above. 
 
Cross-Sectional Test Variables 
 Foreign Foreign Dummy, coded as one if Pre-Tax Foreign Income (PIFO) over periods 
t-2, t-1, and t ÷ Pre-tax Income over periods t-2, t-1 is greater than five percent; 
zero otherwise. 
 RD_Intan R&D and Intangibles Dummy, coded as one if Research and Development 
(RD) + Intangibles (INTAN) over periods t-2, t-1, and t is not equal to zero; 
zero otherwise. 
 Institutional Institutional Dummy, coded as one if the Institutional Ownership Percentage 
over periods t-2, t-1 is above its mean value; zero otherwise. 
 Analyst Analyst Indicator, coded as one if the IBES database contains at least one 
analyst earnings forecast in period t-2, t-1, or t; zero otherwise. 
Other Variables 
CAPINT Capital Intensity, computed as the ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment 
(PPEGT) to assets (AT). 
INTAN_INT Intangible Intensity, computed as the ratio of research and development (XRD) 
and advertising (XAD) to sales (SALE). 
DUM_INTAN Intangible Indicator, computed as 1 if a firm has zero or missing XRD and 
XAD, and 0 otherwise 
NEGTI Negative Taxable Income Ratio, computed as the proportion of years with 
negative taxable income from year t-2 to year t. Taxable income is defined as 
[total tax expense (TXT) less deferred tax expense (TXDI)] ÷ top statutory tax 
rate (35 percent) less the change in net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF). 
OPCYCLE Operating Cycle, computed as the natural log of the sum of a firm’s days 
accounts receivable (RECT/SALE) and days inventory (INVT/COGS). 
SALE_VOL Sales Volatility, computed as the standard deviation of sales (SALE), scaled by 
total assets (AT), over the prior three years. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 N 
Dependent Variables            
  RESTATEMENT 0.19  0.393  0  0  0  35,201 
  FAVG_CETR 0.201  0.168  0.037  0.189  0.323  35,201 
  FAVG_GETR 0.26  0.154  0.139  0.297  0.369  35,201 
Independent Variables            
  GETR 0.261  0.184  0.094  0.31  0.375  35,201 
  CETR 0.204  0.211  0.007  0.174  0.324  35,201 
  PTIB 0.053  0.192  0.005  0.07  0.138  35,201 
  PTCF 0.114  0.155  0.056  0.117  0.187  35,201 
  GETR_SMO 0.014  0.061  -0.001  0.002  0.017  35,201 
  PTIB_SMO -0.01  0.095  -0.003  0  0.002  35,201 
  VAR_CETR 0.033  0.065  0.001  0.006  0.029  35,201 
  VAR_GETR 0.019  0.045  0  0.001  0.016  35,201 
  VAR_PTCF 0.016  0.081  0.001  0.002  0.008  35,201 
  VAR_PTIB 0.031  0.215  0.001  0.002  0.01  35,201 
Control Variables            
  ROA 0.034  0.175  0  0.061  0.117  35,201 
  MB 2.927  3.054  1.315  2.045  3.309  35,201 
  SIZE 5.75  2.092  4.251  5.694  7.159  35,201 
  LEV 0.149  0.152  0.007  0.111  0.243  35,201 
  R&D 0.035  0.067  0  0  0.04  35,201 
  NOL 0.448  0.497  0  0  1  35,201 
  NOL_DELTA -0.023  0.141  0  0  0  35,201 
  FOR 0.011  0.031  0  0  0.009  35,201 
  INTANG 0.139  0.167  0.006  0.073  0.216  35,201 
  MNA 0.583  0.493  0  1  1  35,201 
  PPE 0.534  0.385  0.227  0.448  0.765  35,201 
  CASH 0.172  0.185  0.033  0.101  0.251  35,201 
  BIG4 0.819  0.385  1  1  1  35,201 
  LOSS 0.402  0.49  0  0  1  35,201 
  SPI 0.807  0.394  1  1  1  35,201 
  RSST_ACC 0.044  0.109  -0.01  0.034  0.089  35,201 
  CH_REC 0.014  0.038  -0.002  0.008  0.026  35,201 
  CH_INV 0.009  0.03  0  0.002  0.017  35,201 
  SOFT_AT 0.546  0.232  0.379  0.574  0.729  35,201 
  CH_CS 0.140  0.314  -0.364  0.081  2.876  35,201 
  CH_ROA -0.002  0.059  -0.019  -0.001  0.014  35,201 
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  ISSUE 0.964  0.186  1  1  1  35,201 
 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except for ETRs, which are winsorized at zero 
and one. Unless otherwise indicated, variables are measured as an average over years t-2, t-1, and t. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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 Table 2 
 
Pearson Correlation Table 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) RESTATEMENT 1.00             
(2) FAVG_CETR -0.04* 1.00            
(3) FAVG_GETR -0.02* 0.58* 1.00           
(4) GETR -0.03* 0.37* 0.47* 1.00          
(5) CETR -0.04* 0.39* 0.33* 0.60* 1.00         
(6) PTIB -0.06* 0.36* 0.40* 0.36* 0.30* 1.00        
(7) PTCF -0.04* 0.33* 0.38* 0.33* 0.27* 0.84* 1.00       
(8) GETR_SMO -0.02* 0.11* 0.10* 0.11* 0.47* 0.05* 0.03* 1.00      
(9) PTIB_SMO -0.03* 0.10* 0.11* 0.11* 0.09* 0.42* 0.27* 0.02* 1.00     
(10) VAR_CETR 0.02* 0.05* 0.07* 0.30* 0.56* -0.02* -0.02* 0.74* 0.03* 1.00    
(11) VAR_GETR 0.06* -0.07* -0.04* 0.28* 0.15* -0.08* -0.07* -0.30* 0.00 0.41* 1.00   
(12) VAR_PTCF 0.02* -0.09* -0.11* -0.10* -0.08* -0.27* -0.21* -0.02* -0.33* -0.02* 0.00 1.00  
(13) VAR_PTIB 0.03* -0.09* -0.11* -0.11* -0.09* -0.38* -0.25* -0.02* -0.79* -0.03* -0.01 0.71* 1.00 
(14) ROA -0.07* 0.39* 0.43* 0.39* 0.32* 0.90* 0.78* 0.06* 0.32* 0.00 -0.08* -0.20* -0.27* 
(15) MB 0.02* -0.04* -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* -0.07* 0.01* -0.07* -0.16* -0.11* -0.06* 0.19* 0.19* 
(16) SIZE 0.03* 0.21* 0.22* 0.23* 0.16* 0.25* 0.28* -0.01 0.11* 0.00 0.01 -0.18* -0.14* 
(17) LEV 0.01* -0.02* 0.10* 0.10* -0.01 -0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.05* 0.04* 0.05* -0.09* -0.07* 
(18) R&D 0.00 -0.23* -0.30* -0.28* -0.20* -0.32* -0.30* -0.07* -0.10* -0.05* 0.01* 0.13* 0.11* 
(19) NOL 0.07* -0.14* -0.14* -0.15* -0.15* -0.17* -0.15* -0.07* -0.05* 0.00 0.10* 0.02* 0.04* 
(20) NOL_DELTA -0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 0.01 0.02* 0.05* 0.03* -0.01 0.00 -0.03* -0.03* 0.02* 0.01 
(21) FOR -0.02* 0.14* 0.05* 0.07* 0.11* 0.22* 0.20* 0.00 0.04* -0.02* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 
(22) INTANG 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.03* -0.03* 0.00 -0.04* 0.00 0.00 0.05* -0.06* -0.02* 
(23) MNA 0.02* 0.10* 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.10* 0.01 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* -0.07* -0.04* 
(24) PPE -0.04* -0.03* 0.06* 0.05* -0.02* 0.02* 0.15* 0.01* 0.04* -0.01 -0.03* -0.08* -0.06* 
(25) CASH 0.00 -0.14* -0.24* -0.23* -0.14* -0.13* -0.12* -0.07* -0.11* -0.06* 0.00 0.19* 0.15* 
(26) BIG4 0.00 0.11* 0.13* 0.14* 0.10* 0.15* 0.17* 0.00 0.09* 0.01* 0.02* -0.12* -0.12* 
(27) LOSS 0.08* -0.40* -0.39* -0.40* -0.45* -0.55* -0.48* -0.06* -0.15* 0.10* 0.22* 0.11* 0.13* 
(28) SPI 0.07* -0.06* -0.05* -0.04* -0.05* -0.10* -0.07* 0.00 -0.02* 0.07* 0.10* -0.02* 0.00 
(29) RSST_ACC -0.01* 0.06* 0.12* 0.08* 0.06* 0.26* 0.19* -0.03* -0.09* -0.07* -0.06* 0.15* 0.14* 
(30) CH_REC -0.02* 0.10* 0.10* 0.09* 0.08* 0.20* 0.07* -0.01* -0.02* -0.04* -0.04* 0.09* 0.05* 
(31) CH_INV 0.00 0.12* 0.11* 0.10* 0.11* 0.18* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* -0.03* -0.06* 0.04* 0.01 
(32) SOFT_AT 0.03* 0.16* 0.12* 0.11* 0.14* 0.07* -0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.08* 0.04* -0.09* -0.08* 
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(33) CH_CS -0.01* -0.06* -0.46* -0.06* -0.07* -0.04* -0.03* -0.05 0.08* -0.06* -0.02* 0.21* 0.15* 
(34) CH_ROA 0.00 0.03* 0.04* -0.05* -0.04* 0.04* 0.01 -0.05* -0.07* -0.07* -0.02* 0.17* 0.14* 
(35) ISSUE 0.04* -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.00 -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.00 
 
* denotes statistical significance level of p<0.05. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Correlations between control variables are not displayed 
for brevity and readability.  
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Table 3: Main Results 
Regressions of Restatement 
          
Dependent Variable Restatement 
 All Restatements Tax Issue Restatements Non-Tax Issue Restatements 
 All Non-Fraud Fraud All Non-Fraud Fraud All Non-Fraud Fraud 
# of Restatements 6,705 6,459 246 1,541 1,525 16 5,164 4,979 185 
# of Non-Restatements 28,496 28,496 27,144 28,247 28,247 11,638 28,496 28,496 26,833 
Total Observations 35,201 34,955 27,390 29,788 29,772 11,654 33,660 33,475 27,018 
Restatement % 19.0% 18.5% 0.9% 5.2% 5.1% 0.1% 15.3% 14.9% 0.7% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GETR -0.144 -0.134 -0.424 0.067 0.083 -1.101 -0.221 -0.204 -0.714 
 (-0.86) (-0.80) (-0.56) (0.21) (0.26) (-0.51) (-1.22) (-1.12) (-0.75) 
PTIB 0.025 0.029 0.358 0.756 0.775 -34.885** -0.101 -0.106 1.251 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.20) (1.33) (1.36) (-2.30) (-0.35) (-0.37) (0.66) 
CETR -0.132 -0.118 -0.365 -0.787** -0.827** 2.448*** 0.110 0.147 -0.610 
 (-0.75) (-0.65) (-0.50) (-2.29) (-2.38) (3.92) (0.56) (0.74) (-0.73) 
PTCF 0.412 0.439 -0.510 -0.043 -0.009 0.507 0.520* 0.538* -0.401 
 (1.50) (1.59) (-0.35) (-0.07) (-0.02) (0.06) (1.81) (1.85) (-0.24) 
GETR_SMO -1.547*** -1.459*** -4.039** -2.316*** -2.199** -10.499** -1.219** -1.167** -2.785 
 (-3.10) (-2.88) (-2.25) (-2.73) (-2.56) (-2.19) (-2.15) (-2.03) (-1.14) 
PTIB_SMO 0.252 0.227 2.971 0.677 0.655 15.797 0.141 0.121 2.287 
 (0.91) (0.81) (1.15) (1.22) (1.18) (1.32) (0.48) (0.41) (0.96) 
VAR_CETR 2.193*** 2.090*** 4.545*** 5.097*** 5.073*** 4.301 1.032 0.851 5.230** 
 (3.93) (3.68) (2.72) (5.81) (5.73) (0.85) (1.64) (1.32) (2.40) 
VAR_PTIB 0.129 0.123 -0.121 0.270 0.265 -160.459*** 0.072 0.066 -0.044 
 (1.08) (1.02) (-0.20) (1.24) (1.21) (-3.29) (0.57) (0.52) (-0.14) 
ROA -1.058*** -1.107*** 0.698 -1.088* -1.130* 40.494** -1.078*** -1.130*** 0.151 
 (-3.86) (-4.02) (0.41) (-1.80) (-1.87) (2.36) (-3.81) (-3.97) (0.09) 
MB 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.012 0.038** 0.039*** -0.358 0.014* 0.015* 0.022 
 (2.62) (2.64) (0.38) (2.54) (2.59) (-0.73) (1.72) (1.73) (0.66) 
SIZE 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.070 0.188*** 0.191*** -0.029 0.114*** 0.126*** -0.080 
 (5.23) (5.44) (0.63) (3.60) (3.64) (-0.15) (4.41) (4.78) (-0.72) 
LEV -0.059 -0.032 -1.161 0.256 0.279 -2.726 -0.152 -0.119 -1.546 
 (-0.27) (-0.14) (-1.08) (0.61) (0.66) (-0.92) (-0.63) (-0.48) (-1.13) 
RD -0.715 -0.669 -2.413 -2.034* -1.932* -19.099*** -0.326 -0.289 -1.802 
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 (-1.43) (-1.33) (-0.79) (-1.90) (-1.81) (-2.58) (-0.62) (-0.55) (-0.54) 
NOL 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.191 0.170 0.167 0.302 0.160*** 0.162*** 0.097 
 (2.80) (2.76) (0.78) (1.56) (1.52) (0.22) (2.65) (2.66) (0.36) 
NOL_DELTA -0.013 -0.017 0.194 0.047 0.077 -3.042 -0.039 -0.055 0.401 
 (-0.10) (-0.13) (0.34) (0.19) (0.31) (-1.13) (-0.27) (-0.37) (0.56) 
FOR -0.724 -0.550 -4.673 1.713 1.702 7.646 -1.732* -1.558 -4.749 
 (-0.80) (-0.60) (-1.00) (1.09) (1.08) (0.51) (-1.70) (-1.53) (-0.86) 
INTANG -0.321 -0.316 -0.414 -0.732* -0.742* 0.811 -0.232 -0.256 0.434 
 (-1.39) (-1.36) (-0.43) (-1.68) (-1.70) (0.27) (-0.91) (-1.00) (0.39) 
MNA -0.120** -0.124** 0.047 -0.030 -0.040 1.145** -0.143** -0.144** 0.001 
 (-2.17) (-2.24) (0.17) (-0.29) (-0.38) (2.19) (-2.35) (-2.37) (0.00) 
PPE -0.328** -0.334** -0.228 -0.108 -0.088 -4.419* -0.412** -0.425** -0.098 
 (-2.11) (-2.12) (-0.31) (-0.39) (-0.32) (-1.82) (-2.37) (-2.42) (-0.12) 
CASH -0.411 -0.387 -1.590 0.170 0.177 -3.780 -0.582 -0.568 -1.728 
 (-1.21) (-1.13) (-1.08) (0.27) (0.28) (-1.40) (-1.57) (-1.51) (-1.12) 
BIG4 -0.101 -0.115 0.181 -0.227 -0.244* 0.000 -0.068 -0.081 0.095 
 (-1.32) (-1.48) (0.48) (-1.58) (-1.69) (.) (-0.83) (-0.96) (0.25) 
PI_LOSS_DUM 0.292*** 0.300*** 0.248 0.234* 0.230* 1.598** 0.327*** 0.345*** -0.014 
 (4.63) (4.70) (0.84) (1.90) (1.86) (2.12) (4.76) (4.94) (-0.04) 
SPI_DUM 0.289*** 0.269*** 0.986*** 0.481*** 0.478*** 1.351 0.254*** 0.234*** 0.913** 
 (4.54) (4.19) (2.82) (3.52) (3.48) (1.00) (3.66) (3.33) (2.53) 
RSST_ACC 0.460** 0.471** -0.252 0.142 0.165 -2.653 0.537** 0.554** -0.544 
 (2.08) (2.11) (-0.25) (0.33) (0.39) (-1.20) (2.22) (2.27) (-0.44) 
CH_REC 0.192 0.198 -0.892 -1.426 -1.545 20.681*** 0.643 0.664 -0.449 
 (0.28) (0.28) (-0.35) (-0.98) (-1.05) (5.04) (0.86) (0.87) (-0.15) 
CH_INV 2.358*** 2.487*** -0.870 0.702 0.919 -15.517*** 2.678*** 2.758*** 0.215 
 (2.81) (2.91) (-0.30) (0.43) (0.56) (-3.54) (2.94) (2.96) (0.07) 
SOFT_AT 0.182 0.136 1.359 0.984* 1.027* -6.244*** -0.055 -0.112 1.371 
 (0.60) (0.45) (1.02) (1.79) (1.86) (-2.79) (-0.17) (-0.33) (0.95) 
CH_CS 0.053 0.051 0.125 0.034 0.039 -2.282 0.064 0.057 0.170 
 (0.88) (0.84) (0.45) (0.24) (0.27) (-1.00) (1.01) (0.90) (0.63) 
CH_ROA -0.130 -0.118 -0.941 -0.462 -0.465 -3.932 -0.089 -0.069 -1.123 
 (-0.47) (-0.42) (-0.83) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.30) (-0.23) (-0.88) 
ISSUE 0.453*** 0.467*** -0.030 0.319 0.340 -0.580 0.493*** 0.481** 0.673 
 (2.89) (2.88) (-0.06) (1.21) (1.27) (-0.45) (2.67) (2.54) (1.12) 
Constant -5.554*** -5.622*** -6.545*** -8.349*** -8.617*** -0.716 -5.202*** -5.260*** -6.222*** 
 (-10.64) (-10.64) (-3.88) (-8.82) (-8.89) (-0.19) (-9.64) (-9.63) (-3.51) 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.077 0.079 0.079 0.086 0.087 0.245 0.075 0.079 0.074 
 
This table reports the estimates of Eq. (1) using Logistic Regression. All columns use the labeled restatement type as the dependent variable. When 
not looking at total restatements (i.e., in column 1), we drop observations with the opposite type of restatement. For example, the 246 fraud 
observations in column 3 are removed from the sample in column 2, while the 6, 459 non-fraud restatement observations in column 2 are removed 
from the sample in column 3. We also require that each non-restatement observation have at least one restatement observation in the same industry 
or year to be included in the sample.*, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile except for ETRs, which are winsorized at zero and one, to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 
Regressions of Future Cash ETR 
      
Dependent Variable 
Average 3-year Future 
CETR (FAVG_CETR)  
Average 3-year Future 
GETR (FAVG_GETR)   
 Base Extended Base Extended Extended 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
Total Observations 35,201 35,201 35,201 35,201 35,201 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GETR 0.129*** 0.103*** 0.222*** 0.186*** 0.357*** 
(16.79) (13.64) (25.97) (21.32) (40.85) 
PTIB 0.146*** 0.060*** 0.108*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 
 (17.73) (7.25) (13.51) (7.48) (6.98) 
CETR 0.172*** 0.135*** 0.191*** 0.158*** 0.036*** 
(27.83) (22.30) (30.82) (25.53) (8.09) 
PTCF 0.110*** 0.081*** 0.088*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (11.33) (8.28) (9.41) (7.45) (8.47) 
GETR_SMO   0.173*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 
  (5.96) (3.89) (3.30) 
GETR×GETR_SMO   1.112*** 0.941*** 1.436*** 
  (16.23) (13.86) (20.11) 
PTIB_SMO   -0.034** -0.024 -0.031** 
   (-2.25) (-1.57) (-1.97) 
VAR_CETR   -0.200*** -0.113*** -0.058* 
  (-7.02) (-3.92) (-1.91) 
GETR×VAR_CETR   -1.909*** -1.605*** -1.974*** 
   (-28.10) (-23.31) (-26.23) 
VAR_PTIB   -0.007 0.003 0.002 
  (-0.92) (0.45) (0.30) 
ROA  0.013  -0.006 0.049*** 
 (1.33)  (-0.62) (4.84) 
MB  -0.000  -0.000 -0.001** 
 (-0.38)  (-0.45) (-2.07) 
SIZE  0.006***  0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (6.62)  (6.11) (4.15) 
LEV  -0.083***  -0.077*** 0.013 
 (-8.17)  (-7.72) (1.46) 
R&D  -0.185***  -0.164*** -0.096*** 
 (-9.05)  (-8.28) (-4.71) 
NOL  -0.014***  -0.011*** -0.003 
 (-5.22)  (-4.19) (-1.17) 
NOL_DELTA  0.005  0.007 0.011* 
 (0.68)  (0.99) (1.71) 
FOR  0.171***  0.197*** -0.232*** 
 (3.31)  (3.98) (-6.20) 
INTANG  -0.010  -0.010 0.001 
  (-0.95)  (-1.00) (0.16) 
M&A  0.008***  0.008*** 0.000 
  (3.15)  (3.01) (0.21) 
PPE  -0.013**  -0.012** -0.005 
  (-2.54)  (-2.49) (-1.22) 
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CASH  -0.041***  -0.032*** -0.048*** 
  (-4.38)  (-3.59) (-5.84) 
BIG4  0.006  0.006* 0.006* 
  (1.52)  (1.66) (1.92) 
LOSS  -0.042***  -0.027*** -0.015*** 
  (-13.38)  (-8.57) (-5.30) 
SPI  -0.009***  -0.008*** -0.001 
  (-3.24)  (-2.88) (-0.42) 
Constant 0.169*** 0.192*** 0.178*** 0.193*** 0.242*** 
 (9.27) (9.13) (11.59) (10.70) (10.34) 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.271 0.304 0.304 0.324 0.392 
 
This table reports the estimates of Eq. (2) using OLS. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the future 3-year average 
cash ETR for periods t+1 through t+3 as the dependent variable. Column (5) uses the future 3-year average GAAP 
ETR for periods t+1 through t+3. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for ETRs, which are winsorized at zero 
and one, to mitigate the effect of outliers and mean-centered to improve interpretability of the main effects. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 - Split on Changes on Shareholder Equity 
Regressions of Restatement 
  
Dependent Variable Restatement 
 All Restatements Tax Issue Restatements Non-Tax Issue 
Restatements 
 negative zero/pos negative zero/pos negative zero/pos 
# of Restatements 2,945 2,495 794 481 2,151 2,014 
# of Non-Restatements 28,496 28,496 27,767 26,133 28,496 28,496 
Total Observations 31,441 30,991 28,561 26,614 30,647 30,510 
Restatement % 9.4% 8.1% 2.8% 1.8% 7.0% 6.6% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GETR -0.148 0.105 -0.254 0.560 -0.092 -0.013 
 (-0.61) (0.42) (-0.58) (1.10) (-0.33) (-0.05) 
PTIB -0.360 -0.343 0.460 0.418 -0.500 -0.547 
 (-0.81) (-0.96) (0.51) (0.63) (-1.02) (-1.35) 
CETR -0.375 0.242 -0.918** -0.382 -0.110 0.422 
 (-1.45) (0.90) (-2.11) (-0.59) (-0.36) (1.46) 
PTCF 0.732* 0.343 -0.245 0.165 1.010** 0.387 
 (1.75) (0.92) (-0.26) (0.20) (2.24) (0.96) 
GETR_SMO -1.820** -0.860 -3.137*** -0.965 -0.960 -0.816 
 (-2.55) (-1.13) (-2.90) (-0.61) (-1.08) (-0.97) 
PTIB_SMO 0.738 0.072 2.636* 0.268 0.491 -0.055 
 (1.49) (0.20) (1.94) (0.39) (0.89) (-0.14) 
VAR_CETR 3.298*** 0.134 6.433*** 2.035 1.489 -0.448 
 (4.29) (0.16) (5.80) (1.35) (1.56) (-0.49) 
VAR_PTIB 0.095 0.132 0.212 0.409 0.032 0.013 
 (0.49) (0.77) (0.96) (1.30) (0.13) (0.07) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.101 0.080 0.116 0.088 0.109 0.075 
 
This table reports the estimates of Eq. (1) using Logistic Regression. All columns use restatement as 
the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for 
ETRs, which are winsorized at zero and one, to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 6 - Discretionary Smoothing: 
Regressions of Restatement 
 
Dependent Variable Restatement 
 Non-Discretionary vs. Discretionary 
Smoothing 
Foreign RD_Intan 
 Mayberry Ind Avg 
ND D 
Split 
Firm Avg 
ND D 
Split 
  
# of Restatements 6,606 6,700 6,548 6,705 6,705 
# of Non-Restatements 27,912 28,422 27,494 28,496 28,464 
Total Observations 34,518 35,122 34,042 35,201 35,169 
Restatement % 19.1% 19.1% 19.2% 19.0% 19.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
GETR_SMO_ND -0.034 -0.046 -0.028   
 (-1.56) (-1.61) (-0.88)   
GETR_SMO_D -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.100***   
 (-2.99) (-3.04) (-3.80)   
GETR_SMO    -0.850 2.711 
    (-1.49) (1.62) 
PTIB_SMO    0.201 0.784* 
    (0.71) (1.69) 
Foreign × GETR_SMO    -2.401**  
    (-2.34)  
Foreign × PTIB_SMO    -0.071  
    (-0.03)  
RD_Intan × GETR_SMO     -4.747*** 
     (-2.74) 
RD_Intan × PTIB_SMO     -0.766 
     (-1.36) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Control × Interactions n/a n/a n/a Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Standardized Coefficients Y Y Y N N 
Pseudo_R-squared 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.085 0.083 
 
This table reports the estimates of Eq. (1) using Logistic Regression. All columns use restatement as the 
dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for 
ETRs, which are winsorized at zero and one, to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 7 - Institutional Investors and Analysts: 
Regressions of Restatement 
   
Dependent Variable Restatement 
 Prc Inst Own Analyst 
# of Restatements 6,705 6,705 
# of Non-Restatements 28,496 28,496 
Total Observations 35,201 35,201 
Restatement % 19.0% 19.0% 
 (1) (2) 
   
GETR_SMO -0.519 -0.056 
 (-0.62) (-0.06) 
PTIB_SMO 0.308 0.595 
 (0.98) (1.61) 
Institutional × GETR_SMO -1.772*  
 (-1.71)  
Institutional × PTIB_SMO -0.299  
 (-0.44)  
Analyst × GETR_SMO  -2.364** 
  (-2.12) 
Analyst × PTIB_SMO  -0.764 
  (-1.30) 
Control Variables Y Y 
Control × Interactions Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Pseudo R-squared 0.096 0.093 
 
This table reports the estimates of Eq. (1) using Logistic Regression. 
All columns use restatement as the dependent variable. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance levels of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile except for 
ETRs, which are winsorized at zero and one, to mitigate the effect of 
outliers. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
